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Título
Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions
Referencia
489383
Board DOC ID
WP/01/205
Fecha
December 1 2001
Nivel de descripción
item
Material
Electronic Records
Language
English
Tema
Central bank policy, Fiscal management, Economic models, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
Creador
Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun, IMF Institute
External document
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    Ref:489383 | Date(s):December 1 2001 | Level: