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Title
A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
Reference
517642
Board DOC ID
WP/03/144
Date
July 1 2003
Level of description
item
Material
Electronic Records
Language
English
Subject
Central bank role, Economic models, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
Creator
Gauti Eggertsson, Eric Le Borgne, Research Department
External document
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Ref:865759 | Level:
- Executive Board Documents
  Ref:169321 | Level:collection
  contains 61
  - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:337593 | Level:series
    contains 28
    
    2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sub-series
    contains 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:item

Ref:865790 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:series
  contains 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sub-series
    contains 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:item

Ref:865850 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:series
  contains 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sub-series
    contains 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:item

Ref:865910 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:series
  contains 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sub-series
    contains 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:item

Ref:867316 | Level:
- 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sub-series
  contains 254
  - A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:item