[ChangeLanguage]

Archives Catalog

Main content

Details

Título
A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
Referencia
517642
Board DOC ID
WP/03/144
Fecha
July 1 2003
Nivel de descripción
item
Material
Electronic Records
Language
English
Tema
Central bank role, Economic models, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
Creador
Gauti Eggertsson, Eric Le Borgne, Research Department
External document
Download PDF

Navegador jerarquico

Ref:865759 | Level:
- Executive Board Documents
  Ref:169321 | Level:
  contiene 61
  - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:337593 | Level:
    contiene 28
    
    2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:
    contiene 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:

Ref:865790 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:
  contiene 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:
    contiene 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:

Ref:865850 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:
  contiene 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:
    contiene 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:

Ref:865910 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:
  contiene 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:
    contiene 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:

Ref:867316 | Level:
- 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:
  contiene 254
  - A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level: