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Titre
A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
Référence
517642
Board DOC ID
WP/03/144
Date
July 1 2003
Niveau de description
item
Matériel
Electronic Records
Language
English
Sujet
Central bank role, Economic models, Executive Board Document (Policy), IMF Working Papers (WP)
Créateur
Gauti Eggertsson, Eric Le Borgne, Research Department
External document
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Ref:865759 | Level:
- Executive Board Documents
  Ref:169321 | Level:
  contient 61
  - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:337593 | Level:série
    contient 28
    
    2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
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    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:pièce

Ref:865790 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:série
  contient 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sous-série
    contient 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:pièce

Ref:865850 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:série
  contient 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sous-série
    contient 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:pièce

Ref:865910 | Level:
- IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:337593 | Level:série
  contient 28
  - 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
    Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sous-série
    contient 254
    
    A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:pièce

Ref:867316 | Level:
- 2003 - IMF Working Papers (WP)
  Ref:511467 | Date(s):2003 | Level:sous-série
  contient 254
  - A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
    Ref:517642 | Date(s):July 1 2003 | Level:pièce